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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the e ciency of a sample of mutual funds that invest in the United
States. Estimating a production function using Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis, we
find evidence that the underlying technology presents economies of scale both at the fund
and firm level. We also find evidence that informational asymmetries a↵ect e ciency. Funds
that invest domestically are likely to be more e cient than foreign funds investing in the
US. Moreover, an inspection at the distribution process shows that funds sold directly to
investors rather than by financial intermediaries are more e cient. The level of ine ciency
persistence is overall high. Persistency of ine ciency is particularly higher for ethical funds,
funds oriented to large firms and lower in funds oriented to growth firms. The analysis done
in two separate periods also shows that the e ciency of the funds changes. In particular,
funds oriented to non-ethical, small and growth firms become more e cient over the period.
Finally, funds’ e ciency decreases during global financial crisis, but at the end of the sample
period some funds recover and their e ciency levels are higher than those registered before
the financial crisis. Our results have implications for investors’ decisions in mutual funds.
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I. Introduction
The performance of the mutual fund industry is a widely debated issue both in academia and in
the industry. Early research has documented that risk adjusted performance tends to be negative
and the large majority of funds underperform the benchmark (e.g., Daniel et al., 1997; Elton
et al., 1993; Ferreira et al., 2013; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Indro et al., 1999), which is usually
attributed to the lack of skill of the portfolio manager. Previous studies have failed to address
whether there are more fundamental reasons that could explain that.
This paper takes a fresh view on the analyses of e ciency of portfolio management of equity
mutual funds. We analyze the portfolio management process by estimating the relationship
between the expected return of portfolios and risk and identifying the impact of several fund
characteristics on e ciency.
In order do that, we use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) introduced in Aigner et al. (1977)
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This methodology assumes an e cient frontier, which
in this context represents those funds who maximize the expected return of their portfolios given
its risk, and allows identifying the factors that explain the deviations from this e cient frontier.
Recently, SFA has been studied from a Bayesian point of view due to some of the attractive
features of this approach, such as, formal specification of uncertainty, easy incorporation of prior
ideas and restrictions, and the computation of distributions of e ciency for each individual
firm. Since the introduction of the Bayesian approach to SFA in van den Broeck et al. (1994)
there has been an increasing number of theoretical studies and applications of SFA from this
perspective and it is currently a very influential approach (see, for instance, the papers by Feng
and Zhang, 2012, 2014; Fenn et al., 2008; Lensink and Meesters, 2014).1 They can overcome
problems of performance measurement with traditional performance measures that arise due to
large sampling errors, for instance, funds seem to outperform their benchmarks, even when the
managers do not have skills to outperform (see Annaert et al., 2003; Kothari and Warner, 2001).
We use a sample of mutual funds that invest in the United States. We assume that the
1A survey on these methodologies can be seen in Murillo-Zamorano (2004) and Greene (2008).
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e ciency is a↵ected by the following factors: First, the nature of the returns to scale relation (i.e.
the existence of increasing or decreasing economies of scale). Along the arguments that support
increasing economies of scale are that fixed expenses such as managerial and administrative costs
that are distributed over a large base of assets under management or large funds that have more
investment opportunities available. However, decreasing economies of scale can happen because
when large funds trade and they impact the market, it may create adverse e↵ects. Moreover, large
funds have di culty in finding good investment opportunities, or organizational diseconomies due
to the large number of securities to deal.
We also investigate the role of economies of scale at family level. Larger families are more
capable of a↵ecting the performance of their funds. Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) assume that
firm expertise depends on total assets under management of the company, as larger companies
are likely to be better equipped with resources (e.g. fund managers, research teams, databases,
software or administrative sta↵).
The estimation supports the existence of increasing economies of scale. Larger size leads to
higher e ciency and also funds from large families are likely to be more e cient. Fund flows
relate positively with ine ciency and also ine ciency is positively related with volatility of flows
since managers have to keep large amounts in cash that erodes performance or to buy or sell
securities frequently that also erodes performance.
We also consider information as an e ciency determinant. The models of Gehrig (1993) or
Brennan and Cao (1997) have posit that foreign portfolio managers are at informational disad-
vantage to local portfolio managers, therefore we investigate whether it relates with ine ciency.
The results point that informational asymmetries are likely to be a source of ine ciency as we
find that funds that invest domestically are likely to be more e cient than foreign funds investing
in the United States.
By following a certain investment style, the portfolio managers commit to certain stocks and
restrain their investment opportunity set. A consequence of restricting the investment universe
is that diversification benefits decrease, therefore e ciency might decrease. Moreover, additional
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ine ciencies might arise because of the type of asset selected. Confirming our hypothesis, we find
that ethical funds are likely to be more ine cient as well as funds that invest in large companies.
On the contrary, we find that funds oriented to growth firms are likely to be more e cient.
The way the fund is delivered to the investor also matters in the management process. This
can arise because the e↵ort of the portfolio managers is likely to be higher for some types of
investors. For instance, less informed investors might choose a certain channel of distribution
and these investors are less likely to exert less pressure on fund managers. The results show that
funds sold directly rather than using financial intermediaries are more e cient.
Finally, we analyze the persistence of ine ciency by modeling a dynamic specification for the
ine ciency that captures the proportion of ine ciency that is transmitted from one period to the
next. We estimate fund-specific ine ciency persistence, which allows us to identify important
di↵erences in persistence among funds with di↵erent characteristics. We observe that funds with
more persistence ine ciency do not become more e cient and even might be less e cient in
the future. Persistency of ine ciency is particularly higher for ethical funds, funds oriented to
large firms and lower in funds oriented to growth firms. The high level of ine ciency persistence
suggests that adjustment costs on the portfolio can be high preventing managers from making
instant adjustments. Moreover, regulation, information failures and other management rigidities
may cause funds to remain partly ine cient in the short-run.
The analysis done in two separate periods, 2003 and 2013, also shows that the ine ciency
persistence keeps constant over the period of analysis but the e ciency of the funds change
considerably. In particular, non-ethical funds and funds oriented to small and growth firms
become more e cient over the period. These funds are those with less ine ciency persistence.
Finally, during the recent financial crisis the funds’ e ciency decreases drastically. Neverthe-
less, at the end of the sample some funds recover and they e ciency levels are even higher than
those registered before the financial crisis.
Our work contributes to the understanding of the e ciency of the mutual fund industry con-
firming that factors, such as economies of scale, information, style, and incentives are relevant
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ine ciency drivers. In addition, the level of ine ciency seems quite persistent suggesting that
adjustment costs are high or other barriers prevent the portfolio management process from being
more e cient. Moreover, our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature that uses paramet-
ric frontier methods to measure mutual fund performance by considering a dynamic stochastic
frontier model.
The paper has the following structure. Section II introduces the methodology. In particular,
we define the frontier and propose a dynamic stochastic frontier model to mutual funds that
includes ine ciency persistence and observed heterogeneity. Section III describes the data used
in the paper. Section IV presents and discusses the results. The final remarks are presented in
Section V.
II. Performance Methodology
In the finance literature several measures of fund performance have been developed since the
seminal papers of Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968). Our main benchmark
model for evaluating performance is the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) as in
Fama and French (2010) that improves the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by including
additional factors such as size and book-to-market and matches the categorization if investment
style of US funds (see e.g. Morningstar style box).
In our case, for a fund i at month t the alpha corresponds to:
↵it = Rit   E (Rit) = Rit    0itE(RMt) +  1itE(SMBt) +  2itE(HMLt),
where Rit is the excess return in US dollars of fund i in month t from 1-month interbank rate,
E(.) denotes the expectations operator, RMt is the excess return in US dollars on the market
in month t; SMBt (small minus big) is the average return on the small-capitalization portfolio
minus the average return on the large-capitalization portfolio in month t; HMLt (high minus
low) is the di↵erence in return between the portfolio with high book-to-market stocks and the
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portfolio with low book-to-market stocks in month t. Moreover,  0it is the beta of the excess
return on the market portfolio for fund i at time t,  1it is the beta of the average return on the
small-capitalization portfolio minus the average return on the large-capitalization portfolio for
fund i at time t and  2it is the beta of the di↵erence in return between the portfolio with high
book-to-market stocks and the portfolio with low book-to-market stocks for fund i at time t.
The second equality follows from assuming the following three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993) to hold:
Rit = ↵it +  0itRMt +  1itSMBt +  2itHMLt + "it. (1)
This benchmark model improves average CAPM pricing errors by including size and book-to-
market factors and allow us to compare the e ciency controlling for the style of the fund.
In a sample, ↵it can be estimated using a panel regression as
Rit =  0 +  1b 0it +  2b 1it +  3b 2it + ↵it, (2)
where the beta coe cients are estimated from equation (1) using a rolling window of 36 months.2
A. Stochastic frontier methodology
Frontier stochastic analysis mainly used to assess technical and economic e ciency of firms within
a sector can be also useful to understand the e ciency of portfolio management. It is designed to
capture the deviation of the funds’ performance from what an e cient portfolio can achieve. As
Annaert et al. (2003), we assume that mutual funds cannot earn systematically positive abnormal
returns. This assumption is in accordance with the assumption of e cient market hypothesis
and with the evidence of the empirical literature. However, empirically we can find positive
significant excess returns due to sampling noise. A way of increasing power is to augment model
(2) with a composed error that consists of an idiosyncratic error and a non-negative component
2Note that our measure of performance is already adjusted to risk, so we do not consider it as an input.
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that measures ine ciency, such as:
Rit =  0 +  1b 0it +  2b 1it +  3b 2it + vit   uit, (3)
where vit is the idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal distribution, and uit is the in-
e ciency component. The error uit comes from the assumption that a managed fund cannot
systematically outperform the market portfolio. Model (3) specifies the stochastic frontier. Ear-
lier studies have presented di↵erent choices regarding the output such as total gross returns
(Daraio and Simar, 2006), annualized 3-years returns (Tsolas, 2014) or risk-adjusted return from
a one-factor model (Annaert et al., 2003).
SFA has the advantage of allowing inferences on the parameters and considering idiosyncratic
errors. It also allows dealing easier with panel data structures and to model the evolution of
e ciency over time. Certainly, two di↵erent approaches have been used in the SFA literature
for this purpose. The most common approach is to use deterministic specifications of time (see
Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and Coelli, 1992, for some proposals). These models have the problem
of imposing arbitrary restrictions on the short-run e ciency and they are not able to model
firm-level dynamic behavior. An alternative approach is to specify an autoregressive structure
that recognizes the dynamic behavior of the ine ciency (see Ahn and Sickles, 2000; Tsionas,
2006). In particular, Regulation, transaction costs, information failures and other rigidities may
prevent managers from making instant adjustments towards optimal conditions and might cause
ine ciency persistence. Funds’ managers may find it optimal to remain partly ine cient in the
short-run.
B. A dynamic stochastic frontier model
In this Section, we propose to model observed heterogeneity and performance persistence in
mutual funds with SFA. We apply the dynamic specifications proposed by Gala´n and Pollitt
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(2014) and Gala´n et al. (2015) in order to capture unobserved sources of heterogeneity3, i.e.
the proposed models allow modeling fund-specific ine ciency persistence through a random
autoregressive coe cient and they extend the dynamic model in Tsionas (2006). Finally, the
general implemented model is given by the following equations:
Rit =  ˆit  + vit   uit, vit ⇠ N(0,  2v) (4)
log uit =! + zit  + ⇢i log ui,t 1 + ⇠it, ⇠it ⇠ N(0,  2⇠ ), t = 2...T (5)
log ui1 =
! + zit 






, t = 1. (6)
Equation (4) is equivalent to equation (3) and it represents the stochastic frontier, where Rit is
the excess return for fund i at time t,  ˆit is a row vector,   is a vector of parameters including
a constant, vit is the idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal distribution, and uit is
the ine ciency component. The dynamic specification for the ine ciency is represented by
(5), where ! is a constant term, zit is a row vector of observed heterogeneity variables,   is a
vector of parameters, ⇢i is the fund-specific persistence parameter that captures the proportion
of ine ciency that is transmitted from one period to the next for every fund, and ⇠it is a white
noise process with constant variance  2⇠ , which may capture unobserved random shocks in the
dynamic component. Finally, equation (6) represents the specification of the ine ciency in the
first period and is intended to initialize a stationary dynamic process.
In order to avoid divergences of log uit to positive or negative infinity, which would lead to
e ciencies equal to zero or to one, stationarity is imposed by requiring |⇢i| < 1. In general,
if a firm has a value of ⇢i close to 1 it would suggest that this fund presents high transaction
or management costs, which translates into a high proportion of ine ciency being transmitted
from one period to the next. On the other hand, if this value is close to 0, a low proportion
of ine ciency is persistent in time, implying that the fund moves quick towards more optimal
conditions.
3Gala´n et al. (2015) also study the e↵ects of including observed variables in and out of the dynamic component
of the ine ciency.
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The general model in (5) and (6) allows to evaluate di↵erent specifications by imposing re-
strictions over some parameters. If ⇢i = ⇢ is imposed, homogeneous persistence is assumed for all
companies in the sector. If ⇢ = 0 the model reduces to a static model where the ine ciency fol-
lows a log-normal distribution with firm specific mean. Finally, if   = 0, no observed ine ciency
heterogeneity is modeled.
Using the results for the posterior ine ciencies uit, the e ciency of individual funds in each
period, which is a mesure between 0 and 1, is calculated as:
Effit = exp( uit). (7)
C. Bayesian Inference
The inference of the dynamic model presented in equations (4)–(6) is performed through Bayesian
methods. The Bayesian approach to SFA was introduced by van den Broeck et al. (1994) and
presents as its main advantages the formal incorporation of parameter uncertainty, the deriva-
tion of posterior distributions of ine ciencies for every fund, and the easy modeling of random
parameters through hierarchical structures.
We assume non-informative but proper prior distributions for all the parameters throughout.
For parameters in   we assume a normal prior distribution such that   ⇠ N(0,⇤ 1  ) where ⇤ 
is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all parameters. The variance of the
idiosyncratic error component is assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution  2v ⇠ IG(a, b)
with priors set to 0.01 and 100 for the shape and scale parameters.
As defined in (5) and (6), the ine ciency component follows a log-normal distribution where








for t = 1. For these ine ciency parameters, we have that ! ⇠ N(µ!,  1! ) with
priors set to 1.5 and 1 for the mean and precision parameters, respectively;   ⇠ N(0,⇤ 1  ) where
⇤ 1  is a diagonal matrix of precisions with priors set to 0.1 for every precision parameter; and,
for the fund-specific persistence parameters, we define a hierarchical structure with ⇢i = 2ki  1,
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where ki ⇠  (k, 1  k). This hyperparameter is distributed k ⇠  (r, s) with priors set to 0.5 for
shape parameters. The variance of the ine ciency component is assumed to follow an inverse
gamma distribution where   2⇠ ⇠ G(n, d) with priors set to 10 and 0.01 for the shape and scale
parameters, respectively.4
Given the intractability of the joint posterior distribution in these models, numerical integra-
tion methods such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) have to be used (see Koop et al.,
1995, for the implementation of the Gibbs Sampling algorithm with data augmentation). In our
case, we carry out the implementation of the proposed model using the WinBUGS package (see
Gri n and Steel, 2007, for a general procedure in applications to SFA). The MCMC algorithm
in all the estimated models involves 30,000 iterations with 10,000 discarded in a burn-in phase
and a thinning equal to 5 to remove autocorrelations.
Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis using di↵erent values for prior parameters in the
distributions of !, k and  2⇠ and posterior results are found to converge to approximately the
same values. For the persistence parameter ⇢ we also studied the sensitivity to the use of a
truncated normal distribution and posterior results were found to be robust to the use of this
alternative.
C.1. Model selection
We use two di↵erent model election criteria widely used under the Bayesian approach to SFA.
The first one is a robust version of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) called DIC3, as
developed in Richardson (2002) and Celeux et al. (2006). DIC is a within-sample measure
of fit introduced by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) and defined as: DIC = 2D(✓)   D(✓¯) with
D(✓) =  2 log f(y|✓), where D(✓) defines the deviance of a model with parameters ✓ and data
y. The alternative DIC3 uses an estimator of the density f(y|✓) instead of the posterior mean
✓¯ and has been found to be more stable in models with random e↵ects, mixtures and with data
4These priors have been used before in Tsionas (2006) and Gala´n and Pollitt (2014) and centers the e ciency
prior distributions at 0.8.
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augmentation (see Li et al., 2012). The formulation of the DIC3 is the following:
DIC3 =  4E✓[log f(y|✓)|y] + 2 log bf (y). (8)
The second criterion is the Log Predictive Score (LPS). This is a predictive performance cri-
terion that assesses the out-of-sample behavior of the models. This criterion was first introduced
by Good (1952) and is intended to examine model performance by comparing its predictive dis-
tribution with out-of-sample observations. In order to do this, the sample is split into a training
and a prediction set. In our specific case, the training set contains all the observations except
those for the last period of every fund, and the prediction set consists of those observations for





log f(yi,ti |previous data), (9)
where yi,ti are the observations in the predictive set for the k funds in the sample and ti represents
the penultimate time point with observed data for fund i.
Applications of both criteria to SFA models can be found in several papers using the Bayesian
approach (see Gala´n and Pollitt, 2014; Gri n and Steel, 2004; Ferreira and Steel, 2007, for some
examples).
III. Data
Our dataset of funds is extracted from Lipper. The sample is compiled of open-end equity funds
that invest in the United States from several countries. The estimation is done quarterly time
series for the nine-year period from January 2003 to December 2013.5 We consider only primary
funds and exclude di↵erent asset classes.
For a fund to be in our sample it must report information on net asset value and monthly
returns. Moreover, we require that it has information for all the variables used in the models
5This database has been used in the paper of Ferreira et al. (2012, 2013) among others studies.
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and to have data for at least 40 consecutive months. The latter is important given the dynamic
specification that we use in our models. The final data set contains 1,124 funds. After imposing
some filters on explanatory variables we obtain a total of 50,586 fund-quarters.
A. Fund Features
In this subsection we present the variables of funds that we consider as inputs.
Economies of scale The returns to scale of the underlying technology is a natural input to
consider in a production function. There has been an intense debate in the literature about the
nature of economies of scale in the mutual fund industry. Among the arguments that support
increasing economies of scale are that fixed expenses such as managerial and administrative costs
are distributed over a large base of assets under management, more opportunities available for
large funds or fixed transaction costs decrease with size.
Elton et al. (2012) find that large US funds perform better. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010)
find little impact of fund growth on fund performance, while Pastor et al. (2014) finds that once
industry size is controlled, there is constant returns to scale in fund management in the United
States.6
On the contrary, decreasing economies of scale can happen because when large funds trade
they impact the market, generating adverse e↵ects such as the price impact associated with
large transactions (Perold and Salomon, 1991; Beckers and Vaughan, 2001). Edelen et al. (2007)
advocate that trading costs are the primary source of diseconomies of scale and find evidence that
large funds do not underperform per se, they underperform to the extent they incur in trading
costs. Chen et al. (2004) argue that the lagged fund size and performance relationship is due to
transactions costs associated with liquidity or price impact. They find that the adverse e↵ect of
size and performance is stronger among “small cap funds”. To the extent that small cap stocks
6For non US mutual funds both Otten and Bams (2002) and Ferreira et al. (2013) find a positive relation
between risk-adjusted performance and fund size suggesting the presence of economies of scale for European
funds.
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are less liquid, they argue that their evidence provides support for the hypothesis that fund size
erodes performance because of liquidity. Yan (2008) also finds an inverse relation between fund
size and fund performance, which is stronger among funds that hold less liquid portfolios. He
concludes that the inverse relation between fund size and fund performance is more pronounced
among growth and high turnover funds that tend to have high demands for immediacy.
Another reason for decreasing economies of scale is that large funds have di culty in finding
good investment opportunities that fit their scale and they have to accept inferior investments.
Chen et al. (2004) argue that small funds can easily put all the money in its best ideas, but
because of lack of liquidity a large fund has to invest in “not -so-good-ideas” thereby eroding
performance. Pollet and Wilson (2008) study how funds respond to asset growth. They find that
funds are reluctant to diversify in response to growth but instead tend to acquire even larger
ownership shares in the companies they already own. However, they find that small-cap funds
diversify as they growth, which is associated with better performance. They argue that the cause
of diminishing returns to scale for mutual funds is the inability to scale an investment strategy
related to liquidity constraints as the fund grows.
Other studies refer organizational diseconomies for explaining decreasing returns to scale. As
funds grow this is accompanied by a large increase either in the variety of securities in portfolio
or in the number of accounts, and other authors argue that economies of scale are o↵set due to
the complexity of the number of securities to deal with and the large number of accounts (Amel
et al., 2004; Daraio and Simar, 2006).
Other authors highlighted the existence of an optimal fund size. For Indro et al. (1999)
mutual funds must attain a minimum fund size in order to achieve su cient returns to justify
their costs of acquiring and trading information. Furthermore there are diminishing marginal
returns to information acquisition and trading, and the marginal gains become negative when
the mutual fund exceeds its optimal fund size. Bodson et al. (2011) finds a quadratic relation
between the size of the fund and performance. Grinblatt and Titman (1994) find mixed evidence
that fund returns decline with fund size.
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Following the above literature fund size is measured by the logarithm of total net asset values
in millions of USD (ln tna). To capture non linear e↵ects we include the square term of total
assets (ln tna2).
Economies of scale at family level We follow Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) that
argue that larger families are more capable of a↵ecting the performance of their funds. They
assume that firm expertise depends on total assets under management of the company, as larger
companies are likely to be better equipped with resources. Resources can be fund managers,
research teams, databases, software or administrative sta↵. Certain resources as research teams,
databases or administrative stu↵ can be shared between several funds. Therefore being part of
a large company can economize certain fixed costs creating increasing returns to scale.
The works of Chen et al. (2004), Elton et al. (2012) and Ferreira et al. (2013) show that
controlling for fund size, belonging to larger families increases the funds performance. The
authors attribute this to economies associated with trading commissions and lending fees at
family level.
Following previous work, we use the logarithm of the sum of total net assets of the fund firm
(ln tna family).
We also investigate if fund flows can also a↵ect fund e ciency.
Fund flows are computed as the according to the standard definition in the literature (see
e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), as the change (in percentage) in total
net assets due exclusively to new external money:
Flowit =
NAVit  NAVit 1 · (1 + rit)
NAVit 1
, (10)
thus Flowit is the percentage growth in TNA in a month t net of internal growth (assuming
reinvestment of dividends and distributions), where NAVit is the total net asset value of fund i
at the end of month t and rit is fund is raw return in month t. This definition assumes flows take
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place at the end of the month as we have no information regarding the timing of new investment.
To ensure that extreme values do not drive our results, we winsorize fund flows at the bottom
and top one-percent level of the distribution.
A manager that has to deal with volatile flows has to keep large amounts in cash or to buy
or sell securities frequently that erodes performance. Therefore we expect a positive relation
between ine ciency and volatility of flows. Volatility of flows is computed based on the last 12
months flows (sd flows).
Informational advantages Superior information can be a source of abnormal performance
and we consider it an input in the production process. Several works assume that foreign investors
are at informational disadvantage to local investors (see e.g. Gehrig, 1993; Brennan and Cao,
1997). Also empirical evidence supports that geographical proximity is a source of informational
advantages. Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) and Clare et al. (2013) find that US mutual fund
managers perform better than other portfolio managers when they invest in the United States.
We test whether informational advantage of investing locally is important in explaining in-
e ciency. We create a dummy variable that assumes the value of one if it is a domestic fund
(domestic), i.e. if the portfolio manager invests in local stocks.7
The investment style of the fund By following a certain investment style the portfolio
manager commit to certain stocks and certain ine ciencies might arise. A first obvious conse-
quence of restricting the investment universe is that diversification benefits decrease, which is
likely to increase ine ciency.
We consider several styles of funds. Ethical funds take into account responsible, environmental
and ethical goals in their investment goals. Their investment universe is therefore restricted,
which implies that the diversification of the portfolio is limited which must lead to higher risk or
lower return compared to a well-diversified portfolio with no limitations in its investment universe.
7We cannot disregard that larger portfolio management companies have larger resources and are better
equipped to make better investment decisions and produce more e cient funds. Therefore our variable ln family
can also be related with informational advantages at family level.
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On the other hand, ethical funds mostly include companies with good corporate governance and
therefore they are likely to perform better than do conventional funds, which cover all sorts
of companies. The conclusions from studies that compare the performance of ethical versus
non-ethical funds find mixed results. Bauer et al. (2005), Bello (2005) and Statman (2000) do
not find statistically significant di↵erences between the performance of conventional funds and
ethical funds, while Renneboog et al. (2008) find that ethical funds tend to underperform the
benchmark. We use a dummy variable to indicate if the fund is classified as ethical (ethical).
A well-know classification of investment styles are growth versus value investing and it is
widely used to classify mutual funds. In a similar way we also indicate if the fund invests in
growth or value firms (growth). Daraio and Simar (2006) finds only evidence of economies of
scale for the following US mutual funds categories: Balanced, Growth and Growth Income.
Another well-know style is large versus small capitalization firms. One of the reasons that
studies pointed for decreasing economies of scale is the investment in small capitalization stocks
that are less liquid. Therefore, we create a dummy variable that indicates whether the fund
invests in large capitalization firms firms (large).
The Distribution process The studies that address the performance of mutual and distribu-
tion channels are scarce, however the way the fund is distributed also might impact the e ciency
of the production process. The impact might be direct on the costs of distribution or indirect,
because the type of investors in each distribution channel might be di↵erent and might exert
di↵erent pressure on the e↵ort of the portfolio manager. Recently Guercio and Reuter (2014)
show that investing in direct-sold US equity mutual funds are more performance-sensitive (when
compared to funds sold through brokers) which creates greater incentives for fund managers to
engage in more active investment strategies and generate alpha.
Bergstresser et al. (2009), studying the US mutual fund industry from 1996 to 2004, find
that broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns relative to direct-sold funds. We also
use dummy variables to indicate the type of distribution of the fund: Bank retail (bank), dealer
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(dealer) or direct (direct). We identify the direct channel because the direct channel is less
costly for portfolio management firms as they do not need to rely on intermediaries. We also use
dummies to identify distribution by broker or by bank that are an important source of product
information for uninformed investors. Following Bergstresser et al. (2009), we expect that direct
sold funds are more e cient.8
Institutional Our sample also comprises a sample of funds classified as institutional. This
segment is described as more sophisticated therefore more likely to choose e cient funds. We
use a dummy variable to indicate if the fund is classified as institutional (institutional).
IV. Empirical Results
In this section we present the results of the estimation of the model.
A. All sample
Table II presents the results of the estimation for actively managed funds. The coe cient of
ln tna family is negative indicating that more e cient funds are likely to be managed by large
families. This result is consistent with the evidence of Chen et al. (2004) for US funds and for
Ferreira et al. (2013) for a sample of international funds and supports the explanation that being
part of large company can economize certain fixed costs such as research teams, databases or
administrative sta↵.
The coe cients of ln tna and ln tna2 show that the relation between size and e ciency is
non-linear, funds gain e ciency by becoming large. We extend the estimation with additional
variables such as fund flows and standard deviation of flows. Both coe cients are positive
8Many studies have used expense ratios and loads as inputs. As they are commonly referred as ”costs”. They
are costs for investors as they are charged to investors. However they do not correspond to costs in the production
function of portfolio managers. They are revenues for firms, so firms try to maximize them. We consider inputs
from the perspective of portfolio management company. We opt not to use age of the fund as an input, since
earlier studies do not find that age seems to be important and it is usually correlated with the size of the fund
(see Annaert et al., 2003).
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implying that both variables relate positively to ine ciency. As expected a higher volatility of
fund flows contributes to ine ciency as fund managers have to keep more cash that in turn
erodes performance.
The coe cient on domestic is negative confirming our expectation that informational ad-
vantages are important to e ciency. Informational advantages of geographically close portfolio
managers lead to more e cient funds than their foreigner peers, which is consistent with earlier
evidence (Shukla and van Inwegen, 1995). Overall, it supports the importance of information on
e ciency.
Next, we can find the coe cient of variables related with the style of the fund. The coe cients
show that ethical funds, and funds that invest in large capitalization firms are less e cient. The
coe cient is large for funds that invest in large capitalization firms. Funds that are more oriented
to growth firms are more e cient consistent with Daraio and Simar (2006) that also find that
growth funds are more e cient. The coe cient on institutional is positive indicating that funds
for institutional investors are less e cient.
The results show that funds distributed by banks and dealers are less e cient, while funds
sold directly to investors are more e cient. The result on directly sold funds is consistent with
Guercio and Reuter (2014) that show that fund sold directly are less likely to underperform and
also with the result of Bergstresser et al. (2009) that find that fund sold by dealers underperfom
direct sold funds.
Table III provides more details on how economies of scale change with style. To analyze that
we interact the coe cients of ln tna and ln tna2 with the style of the fund. Earlier results have
shown that as funds grow they become more e cient. The interaction coe cients show that this
is stronger for domestic and funds oriented to growth firms, but not for ethical funds and funds
that invest in large firms.
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B. Persistence of Ine ciency
In this section we analyse whether ine ciency persists over time. Traditionally studies measure
performance persistence using correlation between returns, frequency tables or relating abnormal
performance of one period with past period. They address the issue by analyzing whether
“winners” in one period persist in being “winners” in the next period. Hendricks et al. (1993)
and Brown and Goetzmann (1995) find that winning funds (“winners”) over a reference period
are more likely to be in the better performing group in the subsequent period than in the worse
performing group (“losers”), but Carhart (1997) only finds persistence for losers, that is said
on funds that underperform the benchmark. Using SFA, Annaert et al. (2003) find that poor
performers tend to be less e cient in a subsequent period.
The persistence parameter ⇢ in the model measures the proportion of ine ciency that is
transmitted from one period to the next due to costs of adjustment and restrictions in their
portfolios. The models allow that each fund has its specific ⇢i recognizing heterogeneity in
the adjustment process of ine ciency among funds with di↵erent characteristics. Tables II–III
present the posterior mean of ⇢i. Its estimates range from 0.6532 to 0.7163, which represents a
quite high ine ciency persistence and they are di↵erent from zero in all models. Figure 1 shows
the densities of the posterior ine ciency persistence by fund style. The top panel of the figure
displays the posterior densities by fund styles and their complementaries. We observe that funds
with investment styles oriented to large, ethical and non-growth firms present more ine ciency
persistence. On the other hand, the bottom panel of the figure presents the densities of the
posterior ine ciency persistence of large, ethical and growth funds. We observe, in general,
that the least ine ciency persistent funds are funds oriented to growth and those with the
most ine ciency persistence are funds oriented to growth firms. Figure 2 plots the ine ciency
persistence versus e ciency by fund style in two periods 2003 and 2013. We observe that the
ine ciency persistence keeps constant over the period of analysis but the e ciency of the funds
change considerably. In particular, non-ethical, small and growth funds become more e cient
over the period. These funds are those with less ine ciency persistence. Those with the most
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ine ciency persistence register the same e ciency or worsen their performance over the period.
They are ethical, large and non-growth funds.
Finally, Figure 3 shows that around 2008 the funds’ e ciency decreases drastically. These
year corresponds to the beginning of the financial crises. Nevertheless, in 2013 funds oriented to
growth firms and non large and non ethical segment recover and they e ciency levels are higher
than those register in 2003.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the e ciency of the portfolio management of mutual fund using stochas-
tic frontier models. This methodology allows us to measure the deviation of the funds perfor-
mance from what an e cient portfolio can achieve and to identify key ine ciency determinants.
In particular, we propose a dynamic stochastic frontier model that is able to capture fund-specific
persistence of ine ciency and to model scale technology, information, investment style of the fund
and the distribution channel as ine ciency drivers.
The results show that larger funds are less ine cient than small ones which supports increas-
ing economies of scale in the technology. Moreover, funds from larger mutual fund companies are
less ine cient supporting the existence of economies of scale at family level. The results point
that informational asymmetries are likely to be a source of ine ciency as we find that funds
that invest domestically are likely to be more e cient than funds foreign funds investing in the
United States. The results also show that some investment styles are more ine cient such as
ethical funds and funds that invest in large firms, while funds oriented to growth firms are more
e cient. We find evidence that the distribution process also matters. Funds sold directly to
investors than by financial intermediaries are more e cient which might due to investors in the
direct channel be more sensitive to performance.
Results also show that a lot of ine ciency persists to the other period, which might be due to
low flexibility in the management process. Moreover, the least ine ciency persistent funds are
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that oriented to growth firms and those with the most ine ciency persistence are that oriented
to large cap firms. The analysis done in two separate periods, 2003 and 2013, also shows that
the ine ciency persistence keeps constant over the period of analysis but the e ciency of the
funds change considerably. In particular, non-ethical funds and funds oriented to small and
growth firms become more e cient over the period. These funds are those with less ine ciency
persistence.
Finally, at the beginning of the recent financial crisis the funds’ e ciency decreases drastically.
Nevertheless, at the end of the sample some funds recover and they e ciency levels are higher
than those registered before the financial crisis.
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Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Returns 0.0057 0.0347 -0.1848 0.1523
Beta market 0.6430 0.4731 -0.2582 2.4492
Beta smb 0.0055 0.1772 -1.8952 1.5539
Beta hml -0.0186 0.2205 -2.3859 1.3579
TNA family 16,006.3 50,991.9 0.1000 367,207.9
TNA 1,197.9 5,204.2 0.1000 95,976.9
Flows -0.0044 0.0367 -0.2281 0.2718
S.D flows 0.0155 0.0238 0.0000 0.2485
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Table II












 1(ln tnafamily) -0.0179 [-0.0183,-0.0174]
 2(ln tna) 0.0195 [0.01894,0.0204]
 3(ln tna2) -0.0027 [-0.0028,-0.0026]
 4 (flows) 0.3723 [0.3391,0.3980]
 5 (sd flows) 0.4093 [0.3897,0.4320]
 6 (Domestic) -0.2666 [-0.2681,-0.2649]
 7 (Ethical) 0.0388 [0.0337,0.0454]
 9 (Large) 0.1535 [0.1528,0.1542]
 10 (Growth) -0.1197 [-0.1211,-0.1179]
 11 (Institutional) 0.0255 [0.0234,0.0281]
 12 (BankRetail) 0.0239 [0.0198,0.0286]
 13 (Dealer) 0.0285 [0.0247,0.0301]






1 Corresponds to the average posterior distribution for all funds
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Table III
Posterior results for Model 1 with interactions
Parameter Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D
Domestic Growth Large Ethical
Mean 95%PI Mean 95%PI Mean 95%PI Mean 95%PI
Frontier
 0 0.1322 [0.1305,0.1339] 0.1320 [0.1301,0.1337] 0.1286 [0.1203,0.1365] 0.1038 [0.1017,0.1062]
 1(betamkt) 0.0405 [0.0385,0.0426] 0.0396 [0.0375,0.0413] 0.0403 [0.0385,0.0447] 0.0319 [0.0294,0.0347]
 2(betasmb) 0.0334 [0.0301,0.0367] 0.0327 [0.0314,0.0339] 0.0341 [0.0301,0.0379] 0.0339 [0.0306,0.0366]
 3(betahml) 0.0033 [0.0017,0.0048] 0.0037 [0.0017,0.0056] 0.0037 [0.0017,0.0055] 0.0036 [0.0028,0.0044]
Ine ciency
! -0.5345 [-0.5849,-0.4809] -0.4989 [-0.5476,-0.4519] -0.3961 [-0.4501,-0.3595] -0.2682 [-0.2698,-0.2671]
⇢1i 0.6532 [0.5504,0.7438] 0.6542 [0.5522,0.7490] 0.6682 [0.5842,0.7602] 0.7163 [0.5303,0.8627]
 1(ln tnafamily) -0.0140 [-0.0151,-0.0132] -0.0191 [-0.0218,-0.0169] -0.0285 [-0.0327,-0.0241] -0.0252 [-0.0259,-0.0249]
 2(ln tna) 0.0188 [0.0168,0.0174] 0.0219 [0.0217,0.0221] 0.0249 [0.0205,0.0294] 0.0429 [0.0301,0.0534]
 3(ln tna
2) -0.0024 [-0.0027,-0.0021] -0.0016 [-0.0017,-0.0015] -0.0020 [-0.0025,-0.0014] -0.0117 [-0.0119,-0.0115]
 4 (flows) 0.2931 [0.2150,0.3729] 0.3736 [0.3395,0.4124] 0.4787 [0.4030,0.5425] 0.6405 [0.6162,0.6604]
 5 (sd flows) 0.7462 [0.6446,0.8381] 0.3553 [0.3002,0.3916] 0.2507 [0.1920,0.3294] 0.1595 [0.1356,0.1808]
 6 (Domestic) -0.2455 [-0.2725,-0.2122] -0.2502 [-0.2714,-0.2385] -0.2895 [-0.3261,-0.2410] -0.4476 [-0.4499,-0.4468]
 7 (Ethical) 0.0349 [0.0204,0.0474] 0.0231 [0.0204,0.0263] 0.0357 [0.0199,0.0502] -0.2447 [-0.2570,-0.2296]
 8 (Large) 0.1158 [0.1012,0.1397] 0.1369 [0.1203,0.1521] 0.3118 [0.2673,0.3701] 0.0743 [0.0718,0.0761]
 9 (Growth) -0.0790 [-0.0847,-0.0696] -0.1847 [-0.2096,-0.1670] -0.1460 [-0.1906,-0.1023] -0.1969 [-0.1982,-0.1950]
 10 (Institutional) 0.0436 [0.0406,0.0475] 0.0831 [0.0782,0.0883] 0.0265 [0.0158,0.0357] 0.0266 [0.0189,0.0338]
 11 (BankRetail) 0.0235 [0.0201,0.0263] 0.0593 [0.0519,0.0675] 0.0495 [0.0201,0.0751] 0.0579 [0.0314,0.0722]
 12 (Dealer) 0.0293 [0.0278,0.0328] 0.0071 [0.0065,0.0079] 0.0294 [0.0194,0.0405] 0.0430 [0.0407,0.0454]
 13 (Direct) -0.0159 [-0.0194,-0.0105] -0.0460 [-0.0649,-0.0301] -0.0293 [-0.0319,-0.0264] -0.0401 [-0.0477,-0.0333]
 1(ln tna · Domestic) 0.0159 [0.0151,0.0167]
 2(ln tna
2 · Domestic) -0.0006 [-0.0008,-0.0005]
 3(ln tnafamily · Domestic) 0.0111 [0.0107,0.0115]
 4(flows · Domestic) 0.2684 [0.2345,0.3024]
 5(sdflows · Domestic) -0.6242 [-0.6741,-0.5789]
 1(ln tna · Growth) 0.0312 [0.0307,0.0318]
 2(ln tna
2 · Growth) -0.0021 [-0.0023,-0.0020]
 3(ln tnafamily · Growth) 0.0177 [0.0174,0.0180]
 4(flows · Growth) 0.0034 [-0.0284,0.0301]
 5(sdflows · Growth) 0.2859 [0.2054,0.3615]
'1(ln tna · Large) -0.3015 [-0.3557,-0.2589]
'2(ln tna
2 · Large) 0.1130 [0.1095,0.1166]
'3(ln tnafamily · Large) 0.0401 [0.0363,0.0446]
'4(flows · Large) 0.8562 [0.7218,0.9890]
'5(sdflows · Large) 0.6753 [0.4757,0.8526]
1(ln tna · Ethical) -0.1751 [-0.1764,-0.1735]
2(ln tna
2 · Ethical) 0.0246 [0.0240,0.0254]
3(ln tnafamily · Ethical) 0.0316 [0.0286,0.0341]
4(flows · Ethical) 0.1605 [-0.1055,0.3983]
5(sdflows · Ethical) 0.2992 [0.1174,0.6766]
 2v 0.0000 [0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000 [0.0000,0.0000] 0.0001 [0.0001,0.0001] 0.0001 [0.0001,0.0001]
 2✏ 0.0147 [0.0143,0.0151] 0.0149 [0.0146,0.0153] 0.0042 [0.0038,0.0045] 0.0227 [0.0216,0.0237]
Efficiency 0.8592 [0.7919,0.9229] 0.8621 [0.7909,0.9374] 0.8847 [0.8007,0.9612] 0.8887 [0.8215,0.9605]
DIC3 -1154.82 -1153.11 -1150.72 -1150.63
LPS -109.21 -109.08 -108.25 -108.10
1Corresponds to the average posterior distribution for all funds
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Figure 1. Densities of the posterior ine ciency persistence by fund style
Figure 2. Ine ciency persistence versus E ciency in 2003 and 2013
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Figure 3. Evolution of e ciency over time by fund style
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